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THE DOUBLE DOCTRINE AGENT:   
STREAMLINING THE RESTATEMENT THIRD 
OF AGENCY BY ELIMINATING THE 
APPARENT AGENCY DOCTRINE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
[W]hatever a man sui juris may do of himself, he may do by 
another; and as a correlative of the maxim, that what is done 
by another is to be deemed done by the party himself.  “Qui 
facit per alium, per seipsum facere videtur.”1 
Although the law of agency is relatively new compared to other 
areas of law, agency law is the foundation upon which many forms of 
business organizations are built.2  Agency provides the starting point for 
many of the laws governing partnerships and corporations.3  
Furthermore, agency law continues to grow in prominence as laws 
governing relatively new entities, such as limited liability companies, 
expand and existing business entities seek to maximize efficiency 
through cooperation.4  An understanding of agency law “is of great 
assistance, if not prerequisite, to an understanding of the laws of 
partnership and corporations” because in “no other field of law is the 
close interrelation of business practice and the rules of law more 
apparent.”5   
In a world of growing conglomerates and entities in search of 
“synergies,” it will become increasingly difficult to determine who has 
the ability to affect an organization’s legal relationships and how those 
relationships can be affected.  Agency law answers these questions.  
Some relationships are straight forward—the product of clear and direct 
communication by a principal to an agent regarding what and how a 
                                                 
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 2, at 2 (Little, Brown, and 
Company 1882). 
2 FRANCIS B. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT § 3, at 5 (West 
Publishing Co. 1924). 
3 Id.; see also Glenn G. Morris, Personal Liability for Corporate Participants Without 
Corporate Veil-Piercing: Louisiana Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 207, 261 (1993) (discussing how 
corporate law derived the concept of non-liability from principals of agency law); cf. Mary 
Szto, Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context, 23 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 61, 98 (2004) (“agency, partnership, and corporate law, [are] the immediate forbears 
of the LLC”). 
4 TIFFANY, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
5 Id. 
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task should be done.6  Of greater concern, however, are the individuals 
who have the ability to affect an organization’s legal relationships 
despite the fact that neither agency nor agreed authority exists.7  It is in 
these situations that business entities run the greatest risk of being 
caught unprepared for the consequences of actions taken by individuals 
unauthorized by the entities themselves.  Further adding to the problem, 
courts’ application of the doctrines of apparent authority, apparent 
agency, and agency by estoppel are inconsistent and confusing, at best.8  
Such powerful doctrines must be carefully drafted and tailored to ensure 
that they accomplish their respective goals without unduly interfering 
with business’ unending drive for economic efficiency.  With that end in 
mind, this Note streamlines the law of agency by combining the 
doctrines of agency by estoppel and apparent agency in order to 
promote both economic and judicial efficiency.9  
Part II of this Note focuses on state courts’ treatment of agency law, 
in addition to treatments by the Restatement Second of Agency 
(“Restatement Second”) and the Restatement Third of Agency 
(“Restatement Third”).10  Specifically, Part II examines how each of the 
Restatements and courts establish an agency relationship between 
parties and create authority for the agent to act.11  Part III of this Note 
analyzes courts’ applications of the doctrines of apparent agency and 
agency by estoppel under the Restatement Second and Restatement Third, 
differentiating each.12  Further, Part III discusses the differences between 
apparent agency and agency by estoppel, weighing the benefits of both 
doctrines within agency law.13  Finally, Part IV proposes to eliminate the 
doctrine of apparent agency from the Restatement Third and redraft 
section 2.05 outlining the use of agency by estoppel.14 
                                                 
6 See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1 (discussing the creation of actual agency and actual 
authority). 
7 See infra Parts II.A.2., II.B.2., II.C.1 (discussing the requirements for apparent agency, 
apparent authority, and estoppel). 
8 See infra notes 37, 106, 129 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ incorrect 
characterization of the doctrines of perceived agency, agency by estoppel, and apparent 
authority as interchangeable and essentially the same doctrines). 
9 See infra Part IV (proposing revision of the Restatement Third to eliminate perceived 
agency and expand agency by estoppel). 
10 See infra Part II (explaining the requirements for actual agency, apparent agency, 
actual authority, apparent authority, incidental authority, inherent authority, and 
estoppel). 
11 See infra Part II. 
12 See infra Part III. 
13 See infra Part III. 
14 See infra Part IV. 
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF AGENCY THEORY 
In order to understand how to apply the doctrines contained in the 
Restatement Third,15 one must fully understand how the doctrines were 
stated in the Restatement Second and interpreted through case law.  It is 
also important to examine how the Restatement Third has changed the 
language of the Restatement Second, thereby altering the doctrines.  To 
this end, the following section surveys the major doctrines of agency law 
in light of contributions from the Restatements and federal and state case 
law.16  First, Part II.A examines how two entities can form an agency 
relationship and when a principal may be liable even when there is only 
a perception of agency.17  Part II.B discusses the concept of authority, 
demonstrating how different types of authority are created by the acts of 
a principal and the implications of each for the parties.18  Finally, Part 
II.C examines the doctrine of estoppel, which a third party may use to 
bind someone in the absence of either agency or authority.19 
A. Establishing an Agency Relationship 
The first step in determining if a principal is liable for the acts of 
another under agency law is to establish whether an agency relationship 
exists between the two parties.  Part II.A.1 examines the requirements for 
creating actual agency.20  Part II.A.2 studies how courts have used the 
doctrine of apparent agency, embodied in section 267 of the Restatement 
Second, to disperse liability in the absence of actual agency.21 
1. Actual Agency 
Agency is a legal concept which requires the existence of specific 
elements; therefore, mere intention to create an agency relationship is 
                                                 
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 cmt. a (2006).  The Restatement (Third) of 
Agency was published in July 2006 by the American Law Institute. 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See infra Part II.A (examining the creation of both an actual agency relationship or, in 
the absence of actual agency, the creation of perceived agency under both the Second and 
Third Restatements of Agency). 
18 See infra Part II.B (examining how the four types of authority: actual, apparent, 
incidental, and inherent, are created and applied by the Restatement Second and Restatement 
Third). 
19 See infra Part II.C (examining how estoppel is used under the Restatement Second and 
predicting how it may be applied under the Restatement Third). 
20 See infra Part II.A.1 (describing how actual agency is created). 
21 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the requirements for holding a principal liable under 
section 267 of the Restatement Second and noting changes in the language in the Restatement 
Third). 
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irrelevant if the elements of agency are absent.22  While a court may 
consider what titles parties give to their relationships, principals cannot 
escape liability for the acts of a person that fulfills the requirements of 
agency by simply classifying them by a different title.23  
Actual agency requires a “manifestation of consent by one person to 
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, 
and consent by the other so to act.”24  In other words, there are three 
requirements for an agency relationship.25  The first requirement is a 
manifestation of consent by the “principal” to allow the “agent” to act on 
the principal’s behalf.26  While the Restatement Second does not provide a 
definition for “manifestation,” the Restatement Third specifically 
                                                 
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. b (1958) (“The relation which the law calls 
agency does not depend upon the intent of the parties to create it, nor their belief that they 
have done so.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 cmt. a (2006).  Section 1.02, 
comment a, states, “[w]hether a relationship is one of agency is a legal conclusion made 
after an assessment of the facts of the relationship and the application of the law of agency 
to those facts.”  Id.; see also WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 3D at 
4 (West Publishing Co. 1964). 
23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 cmt. b (2006).  Comment b, titled “Judicial 
acceptance or rejection of parties’ characterization,” states: “It is appropriate for the court to 
consider whether the parties’ characterization serves a function other than circumventing 
an otherwise-applicable statute, regulation, or rule of law, or invoking a statute, regulation, 
or rule of law to limit or prevent liability.”  Id. 
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 1.01; EEOC v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 6 F. Supp. 2d 784, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (relying on the 
Restatement Second § 1 and holding that the determination of an agency relationship is a 
legal one that requires manifestation of consent by the principal to allow an agent to act on 
his behalf and subject to his control and consent to so act by the agent); Robert W. Hillman, 
Power Shared and Power Denied: A Look at Participatory Rights in the Management of General 
Partnerships, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 865, 879 (1984) (discussing how an agency relationship is 
hierarchical with the agent being submissive to the principal). 
25 EEOC, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 788.  Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (stating 
“[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a “principal”) manifests 
assent to another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and 
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to 
act.”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (stating “(1) Agency is the fiduciary 
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the 
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.  
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.  (3) The one who is to act is the 
agent.”). 
26 Kirkpatrick v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 473 N.E.2d 173, 176-77 (Mass. 1985) (quoting 
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 that “[a]n agency ‘results from the 
manifestations of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and 
subject to his control’” and holding that it is a decision for the jury whether an employer 
acts as an insurance company’s agent when the employer takes care of administration of a 
group health plan). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/10
2007] The Double Doctrine Agent 345 
illustrates that a “person manifests assent or intention through written or 
spoken words or other conduct.”27   
Second, in order for an agency relationship to exist, the “agent” must 
consent to act on behalf of the “principal.”28  Although both parties must 
consent to the relationship, consent is not required to be stated in a 
contract or other legal writing.29  In some cases, an agency relationship is 
established by examining the relationship of the parties and implying an 
agency relationship although no written agreement classifies the 
relationship as an agency.30   
                                                 
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 1.03 cmt. b.  Comment b describes the concept of manifestation generally as: 
A manifestation is conduct by a person, observable by others, that 
expresses meaning. It is a broader concept than communication.  The 
relevant state of mind is that of the person who observes or otherwise 
learns of the manifestation. . . . Conduct often incorporates more than 
one manifestation, made to different people and carrying different 
legal consequences.  The relevant audience for a manifestation 
depends on the consequence that the manifestation is alleged to 
carry. . . . Expressive conduct is not limited to spoken or written 
words, although it often takes those forms.  Silence may constitute a 
manifestation when, in light of all the circumstances, a reasonable 
person would express dissent to the inference that other persons will 
draw from silence.  Failure then to express dissent will be taken as a 
manifestation of affirmance. 
Id. 
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 
(stating in pertinent part that “the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act”). 
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. b (asserting that in order to have the 
relationship there must be an agreement but it is not required to be in the form of a 
contract); SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 3A at 3-4.  Section 3A of the treatise articulates the point, 
stating “[a]lthough agency is intrinsically consensual, it is not necessarily contractual.  
Consideration is not essential; one acting for another at the other’s direction is an agent 
although he receives nothing for so acting.”  SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 3A at 4. 
30 See generally A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).  In 
Cargill, several local farmers sued Cargill for debts owed to them by the Warren Grain and 
Seed Company (Warren).  Id. at 288.  The farmers asserted that Cargill was Warren’s 
principal and, therefore, was liable for Warren’s debt.  Id.  Cargill agreed to extend Warren, 
a grain elevator company a $175,000 line of credit.  Id.  In exchange for the line of credit, 
Warren named Cargill its grain agent and agreed to give Cargill a right of first refusal to 
buy all grain sold by Warren.  Id.  After several years the line of credit was increased to 
$300,000 dollars, incorporating the first contract and its requirements.  Cargill became more 
and more involved in Warren’s day to day operations.  Id. at 289.  The second contract 
required Warren to get permission from Cargill before it made any capital improvements 
worth more than $5,000, declared a dividend, or purchased and sold stock.  Id.  Further, 
shortly after the contract was executed, Cargill sent several officials to Warren’s offices to 
examine the annual statements, accounts receivable, expenses, inventory, seed, machinery, 
and other financial matters.  Id.  The officials also told Warren that they would be reminded 
to make improvements recommended by Cargill.  Id.  Eventually Cargill sent a regional 
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The third requirement to establish an agency relationship is that the 
“principal” must possess a right of control over the “agent.”31  Although 
the “principal” does not need to actually exercise control over the 
“agent,” the principal simply needs to have the right to exercise control.32  
                                                                                                             
manager to oversee the Warren operation.  Id.  Despite Cargill’s efforts, Warren was forced 
to shutdown.  Id.  After Warren closed operations it was found to be in debt to Cargill in 
the amount of $3.6 million and in debt to local farmers in the amount of $2 million.  Id. at 
290.  The court held that Cargill was Warren’s principal and was therefore liable for the 
debt owed to the farmers, reasoning that Cargill manifested consent by directing Warren to 
execute its directives.  Id. at 291. 
31 Cleveland v. Caplaw Enter., 448 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2006).  In Caplaw, two African-
American males (the tenants) filed suit against the owner of an apartment building for 
discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act.  Id. at 520.  The tenants decided to rent 
an apartment shown to them by Heather Stauber an employee of LC Properties of 
Rochester LLC (LC).  Id.  LC managed the building which was owned by Mr. Caplaw.  Id.  
After providing money towards the security deposit and signing a lease, the tenants 
prepared to move into the apartment.  Id.  However, when the tenants called to determine 
when they could pick up the keys to the new place another employee of LC, Lou Thyroff, 
said they would need to put down a bigger deposit and expressed uneasiness over whether 
the tenants would fit-into in the building, living above a “professional” that would not 
appreciate unruly college students.  Id.  Suspecting discrimination, the tenants contacted a 
housing agency which contacted LC on their behalf and discovered that the apartment had 
already been rented to another individual.  Id.  Later, when the tenants went to LC’s office 
to get their security deposit, Stauber told them that the “professional” tenant had 
complained about the apartment being shown to “black hoodlums.”  Id.  The tenants filed 
suit against LC and, later, against Caplaw as the owner of the building alleging that 
Caplaw was liable as LC’s principal under agency theory.  Id. at 521.  The court reversed 
the defendant’s summary judgment motion and held that Caplaw could be found to be 
LC’s principal and as such could be held liable for the acts of LC.  Id. at 522.  The court 
reasoned that the only issue disputed as to the agency relationship was right of control.  
Although Caplaw had not exercised his control, he still had the right to control.  Agency 
law only requires a right of control, not the exercise of it.  Id. 
 Similarly in Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., the Oregon Court of appeals held that where a 
franchisor exercises control over a franchisee an agency relationship exists.  Miller v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). 
 In Miller, a company called 3K Restaurant (3K) owned a McDonald’s restaurant.  Id.  
3K was allowed to operate the restaurant under a licensing agreement with the 
McDonald’s Corp.  Id.  The licensing agreement was very detailed and mandated that 3K 
comply with several conditions to maintain its license.  Id. at 1108-09.  The agreement 
severely limited what 3K could do without approval of McDonald’s including dictating 
what color schemes could be used, the attire, appearance and amount of staff on hand, the 
layout of the restaurant’s dining and kitchen areas, and the hours of operation.  Id.  Despite 
the control exerted by McDonald’s Corp., the agreement also stated that the two entities 
were not in an agency relationship of any kind.  Id. at 1109.  The plaintiff sued McDonald’s 
Corp. on grounds that 3K was its agent and therefore McDonald’s could be held liable for 
the actions of 3K.  Id. at 1110.  The court held that there was evidence to support a jury 
finding that 3K was McDonald’s actual agent.  Id.  The court reasoned that where a 
franchisor goes beyond setting standards and retains the right to exercise control over day 
to day operations of the franchisee, an actual agency relationship exists.  Id. at 1110.  The 
court further reasoned that a jury could find that McDonald’s had exercised sufficient 
control to establish an actual agency relationship.  Id. at 1111.  But see, Byron E. Fox & 
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Furthermore, the “principal” neither needs to have complete control over 
every moment of the agency relationship nor for the control to be 
effective at all times.33 
The absence of any one of these three elements generally prevents 
courts from finding an actual agency relationship.34  When an element of 
actual agency is omitted, however, some courts consult section 267 of the 
Restatement Second to impart liability upon a principal for the tortious 
acts of another.35 
2. Perceived Agency 
In tort cases, a third party may hold a pseudo principal liable for the 
torts of a pseudo agent if the pseudo principal has intentionally or 
negligently held out the pseudo agent as his actual agent and the third 
party has relied on that manifestation.36  The Restatement Second refers to 
this concept as “apparent agency.”37  However, for purposes of this Note, 
“apparent agency” will be referred to as “perceived agency.”  The 
difference in terminology is made because of the confusion between the 
                                                                                                             
Jennifer L. Jonak, Courts Differ Over Whether a Franchisor’s Control Over a Franchisee Creates 
an Agency Relationship that Will Lead to Vicarious Liability for Tortious Conduct, NAT’L L. J. 
Dec. 22, 1997, at B5 (arguing that the courts should have looked at whether McDonald’s 
Corporation’s control exceeded normal levels rather than just whether they had a right of 
control). 
32 McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d at 1110 n.3 (citing to Peeples v. Kawasaki Heavy Indust., 
Ltd., 603 P.2d 765 (1979)) (“Under the right to control test it does not matter whether the 
putative principal actually exercises control; what is important is that it has the right to do 
so.”). 
33 Caplaw, 448 F.3d at 523 ( “Nevertheless, the control asserted need not ‘include control 
at every moment; its exercise may be very attenuated and, as where the principal is 
physically absent, may be ineffective’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT SECOND OF AGENCY § 14). 
34 SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 3D at 4. 
35 See generally Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 696 N.E.2d 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1998); B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 370 A.2d 554 (Md. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 276 (1958). 
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267.  Section 267 states: 
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and 
thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of 
such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm 
caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant 
or other agent as if he were such. 
Id. 
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (Section 267 is titled “Reliance upon Care or 
Skill of Apparent Servant or Other Agent”). 
Wade: The Double Doctrine Agent: Streamlining the Restatement (Third) o
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
348 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
concepts of apparent agency and apparent authority, and the similarity 
of their respective spellings only exacerbates the problem.38 
Perceived agency is a form of estoppel, which focuses on the 
principal’s interactions with the third party, rather than focusing on the 
principal’s interactions with the agent.39  The requirements of perceived 
agency, as laid out in section 267 of the Restatement Second, are two-fold.40   
The first requirement is an intentional “holding out” by the 
perceived principal that someone is his agent.41  Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, 
                                                 
38 Armato v. Baden, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 301 (Cal. App. Ct. 1999); Baptist Mem’l Hosp. 
Sys. v. Sampson  969 S.W.2d 945, 947 n.2 (Tex. 1998) (“Many courts use the terms ostensible 
agency, apparent agency, apparent authority, and agency by estoppel interchangeably. As 
a practical matter, there is no distinction among them”); State Dep’t of Transp. v. Heckman, 
644 So. 2d 527, 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“The doctrine of agency by estoppel is similar 
to the doctrine of apparent authority such that there is no significant difference between 
them.”); see generally, 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 1 (discussing the 
confusion courts have created by using the names perceived agency, apparent agency, and 
apparent authority interchangeably). 
39 FDL Foods, Inc. v. Kokesch Trucking, Inc., 599 N.E.2d 20, 28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) 
(stating that the doctrine of apparent agency is based on equitable estoppel). 
40 See BP Oil, 370 A.2d at 560-61 (Md. 1977) (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY section 267 and stating one is liable for the injuries to a third party if she has held 
out to that person that the injurer was her agent and the third party has justifiably relied 
upon it).  But See Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).  
The court stated: 
This Court has adopted the following three-part test to determine 
whether vicarious liability based on an [perceived] agency exists: 
[First] The person dealing with the agent must do so with belief in the 
agent’s authority and this belief must be a reasonable one; [second] 
such belief must be generated by some act or neglect of the principal 
sought to be charged; [third] and the third person relying on the 
agent’s apparent authority must not be guilty of negligence. 
Id. 
41 Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 1988); see Gizzi v. Texaco, 
Inc., 437 F.2d 308, 309 (3d Cir. 1971). In Gizzi, the plaintiff purchased a used Volkswagen 
van from a Texaco service station.  Id.  The franchisee repaired  the brakes before selling the 
car, but they failed shortly thereafter.  Id.  The station prominently displayed Texaco 
insignia, including the slogan “Trust your car to the man who wears the star.”  Id.  Texaco 
engaged in considerable national advertising to convey the impression that its dealers were 
skilled in automotive servicing.  Id.  About 30 percent of Texaco dealers sold used cars.  Id.  
There was a Texaco regional office across the street from the station, and those working in 
that office knew that the franchisee was selling cars from the station.  Id.  The court held 
that, under New Jersey law, the question of whether Texaco had held out the station 
operator out as its apparent agent was for the jury.  Id. at 310.  The court further held that 
based on the facts, a jury could find that the station operator was an apparent agent of 
Texaco.  Id.; see also Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978) (holding 
that requiring the franchisee to use the Hilton logo, sign, and color scheme to the exclusion 
of all others is sufficient to establish that the franchisor held out the franchisee as its agent); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 cmt. a.  Comment a states: 
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Inc., clearly illustrates the “holding out” requirement.42  In Crinkley, hotel 
guests were assaulted by a group dubbed the “Motel Bandits.”43  The 
plaintiffs sued the franchisor, Holiday Inn, for inadequate security under 
the theory that the operator of the hotel was a perceived agent of 
Holiday Inn., Inc.44  The court held that perceived agency was a question 
for the jury and that a reasonable jury could find that Holiday Inn had 
held out the franchisee as its agent to the third party.45 
The second requirement of perceived agency is actual, reasonable 
reliance by the injured third party on the manifestations of agency by the 
perceived principal.46  Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., illustrates the reliance 
required under the doctrine of perceived agency.47  In Miller, the plaintiff 
suffered injuries while dining at a McDonald’s restaurant.48  McDonald’s 
Corporation was the franchisor of the restaurant; however, the 
restaurant was owned and operated by a company called 3K Restaurants 
                                                                                                             
The mere fact that acts are done by one whom the injured party 
believes to be the defendant’s servant is not sufficient to cause the 
apparent master to be liable.  There must be such reliance upon the 
manifestation as exposes the plaintiff to the negligent conduct.  The 
rule normally applies where the plaintiff has submitted himself to the 
care or protection of an apparent servant in response to an invitation 
from the defendant to enter into such relations with such servant.  A 
manifestation of authority constitutes an invitation to deal with such 
servant and to enter into relations with him which are consistent with 
the apparent authority. 
Id.; 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2, 473 (discussing several state courts’ 
treatments of the holding out requirement). 
42 Crinkley, 844 F.2d at 156. 
43 Id. at 158-59. 
44 Id. at 159.  The franchise agreement between Holiday Inn and the hotel operator 
required the franchisee to use the “Holiday Inn” trade name and trademarks.  Id. at 166-67.  
Furthermore, Holiday Inn, Inc. was the original builder of the hotel and engaged in 
national advertising that promoted its system of hotels without distinguishing between 
those that it owned and those that it franchised.  Id.  The only indication that the defendant 
did not own the hotel was a sign in the restaurant that stated that the franchisee operated 
it.  Id. 
45 Id. at 167. 
46 Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1112 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the 
crucial issues are whether the defendant held out the franchisee as its agent and whether 
the plaintiff relied on that holding out).  Williams v. St. Claire Med. Center, 657 S.W.2d 590, 
596 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (holding a perceived agency existed because, “[i]n applying the 
above legal principles to the situation here presented, it logically follows that the appellant 
justifiably believed Johnson to be a hospital employee”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY cmt. a.  See generally 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2, 474 
(discussing the different levels of reliance courts’ use and how that affects their analysis). 
47 McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d at 1113. 
48 Id. at 1108.  The plaintiff was injured when she bit into a heart shaped sapphire that 
was inside her sandwich.  Id. 
Wade: The Double Doctrine Agent: Streamlining the Restatement (Third) o
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
350 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
(“3K”).49  The plaintiff sued McDonald’s Corporation on the theory that, 
even absent an actual agency relationship, McDonald’s Corporation 
should be held liable because 3K was its perceived agent.50  The court 
agreed holding that summary judgment for McDonald’s Corporation 
was improper because there was evidence to support a jury finding that 
the plaintiff relied upon McDonald’s Corporation’s holding out of 3K.51 
While Miller demonstrates the level of reliance required for 
perceived agency, the Restatement Second enumerates several other key 
aspects of the doctrine.52  First, the manifestations or “holding out” of the 
perceived principal do not have to be intentional.53  In some cases courts 
use perceived agency when the perceived principal appears to have 
taken insufficient steps to inform the public of the non-agency 
relationship.54  Further, courts only require “ordinary knowledge” of 
business relationships (i.e. franchises) by third parties seeking to assert 
perceived agency.55  The second key aspect of the doctrine of perceived 
agency is that it requires actual and reasonable reliance on the 
manifestations by the perceived principal.56  The third and final key 
                                                 
49 Id.  3K was allowed to operate the restaurant under a licensing with the McDonald’s 
Corporation.  Id. 
50 Id. at 1111. 
51 Id. at 1114.  Specifically, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s testimony that she relied 
on the general reputation of McDonald’s restaurants in choosing to patronize the 
restaurant in question was sufficient evidence to establish a jury question on reliance, 
especially when considered in concert with McDonald’s Corporation’s attempt to create a 
“public perception of a common McDonald’s system at all McDonald’s.”  Id. 
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958). 
53 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03 cmt. b (2006) (“Silence may constitute a 
manifestation when, in light of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would express 
dissent to the inference that other persons will draw from silence.  Failure then to express 
dissent will be taken as a manifestation of affirmance.”). 
54 See generally McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d at 1107; Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 
F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1988); Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971). 
55 McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d at 1113 (holding that to expect that the general public 
would know that individual restaurants are owned by a franchisee rather than the 
franchisor would demand a higher level of sophistication about general  franchise 
relationship than the court is willing to assume.  Especially in the face of efforts on the part 
of the Franchisor to make it appear all of the restaurants are part of a uniform national 
system); see also Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors’ Liability When Franchisees are Apparent 
Agents:  An Empirical and Policy Analysis of “Common Knowledge” About Franchising, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 609, 645-71 (1992) (discussing the Common Knowledge doctrine and 
conducting a survey to question the appropriateness of the Common Knowledge doctrine 
in the Franchisor-Franchisee liability context). 
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958) (requiring “a third person justifiably 
to rely”) (emphasis added); 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2, 476 
(discussing whether section 267 requires reliance and which form of reliance it requires.  
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aspect of perceived agency as laid out in the Restatement Second is that 
there is no requirement of a change of position.57 
On the other hand, the Restatement Third contains several changes 
which may alter how courts apply the doctrine of perceived agency.58  
As stated previously, courts consult section 267 of the Restatement Second 
to confer perceived agency.59  However, section 267 has been divided 
into two different parts under the Restatement Third.60  Under section 
7.07, a principal can be held liable for the torts of another if he holds out 
to a third party that the other is his employee.61  The language of section 
7.07 is very different from the language of section 267 as the drafters 
tried to combine several sections into one.62  However, the Comment f 
definition of “employee” is very similar to the language of section 267, 
except for a change from “represents that another is his servant or other 
agent”63 to “causes a third party to believe that an actor is the person’s 
employee.”64   
                                                                                                             
Ultimately finding that section 267 does require reliance but only simple or justifiable 
reliance.). 
57 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  The relevance of this aspect of perceived 
agency will become more prevalent when the level of reliance required by agency by 
estoppel is discussed later in this Note. 
58 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 7.07, 2.05. 
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267. 
60 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY tbls., at 489 (referring readers looking for 
Restatement Third sections that correspond to Restatement Second section 267 to sections 7.07 
and 2.05). 
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f. 
62 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07.  Section 7.07 defines an “Employee Acting 
Within Scope of Employment” as follows: 
(1) An employer is subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by 
its employee acting within the scope of employment. 
(2) An employee acts within the scope of employment when 
performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of 
conduct subject to the employer’s control.  An employee’s act is not 
within the scope of employment when it occurs within an independent 
course of conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose 
of the employer. 
(3) For purposes of this section, 
(a) an employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to 
control the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work, and 
(b) the fact that work is performed gratuitously does not relieve a 
principal of liability. 
Id. 
63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f.  The text of section 7.07 cmt. f states in 
pertinent part: 
A person who causes a third party to believe that an actor is the 
person’s employee may be subject to liability to the third party for 
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The language shift is significant for two reasons.  First, section 267 of 
the Restatement Second was used as a basis for finding liability in contexts 
other than just an employer-employee relationship.65  Therefore, states 
that adopt the Restatement Third may have to look to a section other than 
7.07 to impart liability.66  The logical choice would be to use section 2.05 
Estoppel to Deny Existence of Agency Relationship.67  This choice leads to the 
second reason why the language change in section 7.07 is significant.  
Under section 267, a plaintiff only needed to show justifiable reliance to 
have a claim of perceived agency.68  However, section 2.05 of the 
Restatement Third makes it explicitly clear that in order to claim estoppel 
the plaintiff will have to show detrimental reliance.69  As a result of these 
changes, it will be harder for plaintiffs to hold perceived principals liable 
in relationships other than in the employee-employer context.70 
B. Authority to Bind a Principal 
After establishing an agency relationship, the agent must possess the 
authority to act in order to bind the principal.  Restatement Second sets 
forth four types of authority:  actual;71 apparent;72 incidental;73 and 
                                                                                                             
harm caused by the actor when the third party justifiably relies on the 
actor’s skill or care and the actor’s conduct, if that of an employee, 
would be within the scope of employment. 
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267; supra note 36 (providing the full text 
of section 267). 
64 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f. 
65 See generally Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1107 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding a restaurant franchisor liable for the negligence of a franchisee restaurant owner); 
Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding a Hotel chain 
franchisor liable for inadequate security at a hotel owned and operated by a franchisee.); 
BP Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 370 A.2d 554 (Md. 1977) (attempting to hold a gas station franchisor 
liable for the negligence of a franchisee gas station owner). 
66 See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the various ways courts that adopt the Restatement 
Third may choose to examine agency problems between franchisors and franchisees). 
67 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 and parallel tbls. at 489. 
68 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  See generally, 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 
Apparent Agency § 2, 476-77. 
69 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 cmt. d (“The third party must prove a 
reasonable and detrimental change of position. . .”).  See also infra Part II.C.5 (discussing the 
concept of detrimental reliance). 
70 See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of proof in 
agency by estoppel cases where change of position is required); see infra notes 225-27 and 
accompanying text (discussing how applying Restatement Third § 7.07 to a franchisor-
franchisee relationship will cause problems for plaintiff’s attorneys as they would have to 
characterize the relationship as employer-employee). 
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958). 
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8. 
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35. 
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inherent.74  Conversely, the Restatement Third only recognizes actual and 
apparent authority, while incorporating incidental and inherent 
authority into several other sections.75  Equally important to the question 
of who can bind a principal is the question of how a person can bind the 
principal.76 
1. Actual Authority 
Actual authority is authority for an agent to act based upon 
manifestations by the principal to the agent.77  As previously stated, an 
agency relationship requires that the principal maintain the right to 
control the acts of the agent performed on the principal’s behalf.78  
Actual authority is created when the principal exercises that right of 
control by manifesting consent for the agent to act in certain ways.79  
However, the manifestations do not have to be explicit.80  If the 
manifestations to the agent specify how the agent should act, the actual 
authority is called “expressed actual authority.”81  Alternatively, actual 
authority may be inferred by the agent from the context in which the 
                                                 
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01, 
2.02. 
75 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01, 2.02; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§§ 2.03, 3.03; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2 int. nt. (referring to incidental authority 
as implied authority and stating that inherent authority has been absorbed by other 
sections). 
76 See infra Parts II.B.1-4. 
77 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (“Authority is the power of the agent 
to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the principal’s 
manifestations of consent to him.”), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (“An 
agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal 
consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the 
principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act”). 
78 Cleveland v. Caplaw, 448 F.3d 518, 522 (2d Cir. 2006); Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 
P.2d 1107, 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1. 
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7. 
80 FDL Foods, Inc. v. Kokesch Trucking, Inc., 599 N.E.2d 20, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) 
(declaring that actual authority may be either expressed or implied); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. b (asserting that authorization of an agent’s conduct can be 
gleaned from reasonable inferences of the principal’s conduct that the principal intended 
the agent to act even if  that was not the principal’s intent). 
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. b (“As commonly used, the term 
‘express authority’ often means actual authority that a principal has stated in very specific 
or detailed language.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. c (“It is possible for a 
principal to specify minutely what the agent is to do.  To the extent that he does this, the 
agent may be said to have express authority.”). 
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authority was granted.82  This type of actual authority is referred to as 
“implied actual authority.”83  The distinguishing factor between actual 
authority and other types of authority is that it is based on the 
manifestations from the principal to the agent.84  Further, because actual 
authority is based solely on the manifestations of the principal, it is not 
contingent upon the principal’s unexpressed wishes or mental state.85  
Under actual authority, the agent is not assumed to know everything 
that the principal knows.86 
The Restatement Third has largely kept the doctrine of actual 
authority intact from the Restatement Second.87  Sections 2.01 and 2.02 of 
the Restatement Third simply change the wording of actual authority from 
section 7 of the Restatement Second, to make it explicit that the section 
pertains solely to actual authority.88  However, despite the change in the 
                                                 
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. c (describing implied authority as powers 
which are implied or inferred from the words used, customs, and relationship of the 
parties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26.  Section 26 states: 
Except for the execution of instruments under seal or for the 
performance of transactions required by statute to be authorized in a 
particular way, authority to do an act can be created by written or 
spoken words or other conduct of the principal which, reasonably 
interpreted, causes the agent to believe that the principal desires him so to act 
on the principal’s account. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
83 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. b (explaining that implied authority is a 
form of actual authority to act in a way that the agent believes the principal wants him to 
act); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. c. 
84 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (defining actual agency), with 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (defining apparent authority).  Compare 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01, 3.01 (defining actual agency), with RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.03 3.03 (describing apparent authority); Mared Indus., Inc. v. 
Mansfield, 690 N.W.2d 835, 844 (Wis. 2005) (recognizing the doctrinal differences between 
actual and apparent authority). 
85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. c (explaining that it is misleading to say 
that actual authority reflects the principal’s intentions because the unexpressed intentions 
of a principal do not create actual authority unless they are reflected in some form of 
manifestation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.01 cmt. c (2006) (explaining that a 
principal’s unexpressed willingness for another to act is not grounds for actual authority.  
The principal must make a manifestation as defined in section 1.03 in order to create actual 
authority). 
86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.01 cmt. c (2006). 
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 rpt. nt. a (stating there is no intended change 
between the Restatement Second and Third with respect to actual authority). 
88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01. 
An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action 
that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably 
believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, 
that the principal wishes the agent so to act. 
Id.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 states: 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/10
2007] The Double Doctrine Agent 355 
language of sections 2.01 and 2.02, the comments to those sections show 
that, in practice, these sections will operate the same way as section 7 of 
the Restatement Second.89  
2. Apparent Authority 
The second type of authority, apparent authority, arises through 
manifestations by the principal to a third party.90  There are several ways 
for an agent to attain apparent authority.91  Direct communication from 
the principal to the third party would qualify as creating apparent 
authority; however, that is not the only way in which apparent authority 
may be created.92  Manifestations may also come from the principal 
                                                                                                             
(1) An agent has actual authority to take action designated or implied 
in the principal’s manifestations to the agent and acts necessary or 
incidental to achieving the principal’s objectives, as the agent 
reasonably understands the principal’s manifestations and objectives 
when the agent determines how to act. 
(2) An agent’s interpretation of the principal’s manifestations is 
reasonable if it reflects any meaning known by the agent to be ascribed 
by the principal and, in the absence of any meaning known to the 
agent, as a reasonable person in the agent’s position would interpret 
the manifestations in light of the context, including circumstances of 
which the agent has notice and the agent’s fiduciary duty to the 
principal. 
(3) An agent’s understanding of the principal’s objectives is reasonable 
if it accords with the principal’s manifestations and the inferences that 
a reasonable person in the agent’s position would draw from the 
circumstances creating the agency. 
Id. 
89 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01 cmts. a-c, 2.02 cmts. a-h (2006), and 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Recovery Express, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D. Mass. 2006) (citing the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 2) (Mar. 2001) (stating that an agent 
acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action the agent reasonably believes 
that the principal wishes the agent so to act), with FDL Foods, Inc. v. Kokesch Trucking, 
Inc., 599 N.E.2d 20, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (citing Section 7 of the Restatement Second) (stating 
that actual authority may be expressed or implied), and Currey v. Lone Star Steel Co., 676 
S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App. Ct. 1984) (stating that actual authority is authority that the principal 
confers on the agent, allows the agent to believe that he has, or by want of due care allows 
the agent to believe he has); Mared Indus., Inc. v. Mansfield, 690 N.W.2d 835 (Wis. 2005) 
(citing to the Restatement Second section 7, stating actual authority is the power of an agent 
to act on behalf of the principal because the principal has made a manifestation to allow the 
agent to so act). 
90 SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 8D at 13. 
91 See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (explaining the ways an agent can receive 
apparent authority through a principal’s manifestations to a third party); see supra notes 81-
87 and accompanying text (discussing the ways an agent can be given actual authority 
through manifestations by the principal). 
92 Lind v. Schenley Indus., 278 F.2d 79, 86 (3d Cir. 1960) (finding that a company owed 
its employee money from a raise in which the employee was told by the Vice President to 
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telling the agent to misinform the third party of the agent’s authority.93  
Further, the authority may be created by the principal placing the agent 
in a position which would lead third parties to believe that the agent has 
such authority.94  Once the principal has made a manifestation, apparent 
authority requires that the third party reasonably believe that the agent 
has authority, and that the belief be traceable to the principal’s 
manifestations.95  A principal may not be bound by apparent authority if 
the third party’s belief that the agent had authority was unreasonable.96  
                                                                                                             
talk with his supervisor and the supervisor, despite having no actual authority to make an 
offer, told the employee he would get a 1% commission on sales of the people below the 
employee).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. c.  “Manifestations as 
defined in § 1.03 may take many forms.  These include explicit statements that a principal 
makes directly to a third party.”  Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27. 
Except for the execution of instruments under seal or for the conduct of 
transactions required by statute to be authorized in a particular way, 
apparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by 
written or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which, 
reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the 
principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person 
purporting to act for him. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27; see also SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 8D at 13. 
93 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 cmt. b.  “A principal may also create apparent 
authority by actually or apparently authorizing an agent to make representations to third 
parties concerning the agent’s own authority or position, even though the agent’s 
representations by themselves would be insufficient.”  Id.; SEAVEY, supra note 22, § 8D at 13. 
94 Three-Seventy Leasing Corp. v. Ampex Corp., 528 F.2d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1976).  In 
Ampex, Three-Seventy filed a suit against Ampex for breach of contract.  Id. at 995.  As a 
result of negotiations between the owner and sole employee of Three-Seventy and a 
salesman for Ampex, a writing was produced by Ampex to sell Three-Seventy six 
computer memory units.  Id.  The owner of Three-Seventy signed the writing; however, the 
court found that a contract did not exist because there was no meeting of the minds.  Id. at 
995-96.  In the alternative, the court held that Ampex was bound to sell the memory units 
because their salesman had apparent authority to bind Ampex.  Id. at 997.  Absent 
manifestations to the contrary, an agent has apparent authority to do those things which 
are usual to the business which the agent is employed to conduct.  Id.  Additionally, it was 
reasonable for a third person to believe that a salesman had authority to bind his employer 
to sell items.  Id.; see also Hallock v. State, 474 N.E.2d 1178, 1182 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that, 
absent manifestations that limit an attorney’s actual authority, an attorney is clothed with 
apparent authority to enter into settlements by nature of her position).  But see Sarkes 
Tarzian, Inc. v. U.S. Trust Co. of Fl. Savings Bank, 397 F.3d 577, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that there was no ground to submit a question of apparent agency to the jury since the 
defendant made no manifestations to the plaintiff that the defendant’s attorney had 
authority to bind them to a contract). 
95 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (omitting any requirement that the third 
party detrimentally rely, i.e. change position, on the manifestation, and instead only 
requiring the reliance be reasonable); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 cmt. b. 
96 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 2.03 cmt. c (Section 2.03 requires that the third party reasonably believe the agent has 
authority and that the reasonableness will reflect business custom, usage particular to the 
industry, and prior dealings). 
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Further, an agent cannot bind a principal by tricking the third party into 
believing that the agent has authority.97 
The Restatement Third retains the doctrine of apparent authority 
unchanged from the Restatement Second.98  However, the Restatement 
Third provides a deeper analysis of the issue.99  Namely, the Restatement 
Third points out some unique attributes to apparent authority which are 
not present in actual authority.100  For example, apparent authority may 
exist even after the agency relationship has been terminated.101  Also, the 
exercise of apparent authority by an agent may create a cause of action 
for the principal against the agent.102   
Treatment of apparent authority by the courts has varied as the 
doctrine has developed.103  Many courts assert that the doctrine of 
apparent authority is indistinguishable from the doctrines of perceived 
(apparent) agency and agency by estoppel.104  However, both the 
Restatement Third and Restatement Second recognize that while apparent 
                                                 
97 Sarkes Tarzian, 397 F.3d at 583 (“New York explicitly rejects the idea that an agent can 
confer apparent authority on him or herself.”); Hallock, 474 N.E.2d at 1181 (“The agent 
cannot by his own acts imbue himself with apparent authority.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. c (“An agent’s success in misleading the third party as to the existence 
of actual authority does not in itself make the principal accountable”). 
98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 rpt. n. a. 
99 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
101 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. a; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 3.11.  Section 3.11, titled “Termination of Apparent Authority” states:  “(1) The 
termination of actual authority does not by itself end any apparent authority held by an 
agent.  (2) Apparent authority ends when it is no longer reasonable for the third party with 
whom an agent deals to believe that the agent continues to act with actual authority.”  Id. 
102 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. a. 
[T]he formulation in this section defines an agent’s “power,” which if 
exercised in a manner not coincident with actual authority, is not 
rightful as toward the principal.  An agent who appears to a third 
party to be authorized, but who lacks actual authority, would breach 
the agent’s duty to the principal by acting in excess of actual authority.  
See § 8.09.  The principal has a claim against the agent for any loss 
incurred. 
Id. 
103 See generally Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. US Trust Co. of Fl. Savings Bank, 397 F.3d 577 (7th 
Cir. 2005); Hallock v. New York, 474 N.E.2d 1178 (N.Y. 1984); Three-Seventy Leasing Corp. 
v. Ampex Corp., 528 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1976). 
104 Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 n.2 (Tex. 1998) (“Many 
courts use the terms ostensible agency, apparent agency, apparent authority, and agency 
by estoppel interchangeably. As a practical matter, there is no distinction among them”); 
see also, Armato v. Baden, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 301 (Cal. App. Ct. 1999).  See generally, 6 AM. 
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 1 (discussing the confusion courts have created by using the 
names perceived agency, apparent agency and apparent authority interchangeably). 
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authority contains elements of estoppel, it is a distinct concept from 
perceived agency and agency by estoppel.105  Each Restatement points 
out that perceived agency and agency by estoppel are used to create an 
agency relationship where one does not exist, while apparent authority 
expands an agent’s authority within an independently created agency 
relationship.106  As a result, both Restatements maintain a distinction 
among apparent authority, perceived agency, and estoppel. 107 
3. Incidental Authority 
The third type of authority, incidental authority, is the authority for 
an agent to perform the tasks which are concomitant to accomplishing 
the authorized act.108  The doctrine of incidental authority provides an 
agent with authority, even though the principal’s manifestations are not 
sufficiently clear or all encompassing.109  The illustrations for Restatement 
Second section 35 provide clear examples of what type of actions are 
considered to be within an agent’s incidental authority.110  The 
Restatement Third, on the other hand, simply incorporated incidental 
authority into its definition of actual authority, thereby eliminating the 
need for a separate section on the issue.111 
4. Inherent Authority 
The scope and reach of the fourth type of authority, inherent 
authority, have been relatively limited.112  In fact, to date, only one court 
                                                 
105 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. e; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 8 cmt. d (1958). 
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. d (1958). 
107 Id. 
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35.  “Unless otherwise agreed, authority to 
conduct a transaction includes authority to do acts which are incidental to it, usually 
accompany it, or are reasonably necessary to accomplish it.”  Id. 
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35 cmt. b. 
110 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35 illus. 1-4. 
111 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 cmt. d. 
If a principal’s manifestation to an agent expresses the principal’s wish 
that something be done, it is natural to assume that the principal 
wishes, as an incidental matter, that the agent take the steps necessary 
and that the agent proceed in the usual and ordinary way, if such has 
been established, unless the principal directs otherwise.  The 
underlying assumptions are that the principal does not wish to 
authorize what cannot be achieved if necessary steps are not taken by 
the agent, and that the principal’s manifestation often will not specify 
all steps necessary to translate it into action. 
Id. 
112 See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
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of last resort, the Indiana Supreme Court, has adopted the doctrine.113  
However, a few intermediate courts have used the doctrine to bind a 
principal.114  Inherent authority binds a principal in cases where no 
actual or apparent authority exists and the elements of estoppel are not 
present.115  The doctrine was created for two reasons:  “the need to 
ensure fairness for the parties dealing with the agent and the goal of 
promoting the general commercial convenience of all parties 
involved.”116  However, with growing concerns for the doctrine’s 
seemingly boundless possibilities, the drafters of the Restatement Third 
decided to eliminate the section and absorb some of its concepts into 
                                                 
113 See generally Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206 (Ind. 2000).  In Menard, 
Inc., Menard Inc. sued for specific performance of a contract for the purchase of a thirty 
acre piece of property.  Id. at 1210.  The defendant, Dage-MTI, Inc., claimed that the 
contract was not enforceable because it was only signed by the President of Dage-MTI and 
was not approved by the board of directors, which was required by a board resolution.  Id. 
at 1209-10.  The court held that despite the board’s continual reminder to the President that 
any offer would have to be approved by the board, the Dage-MTI was bound to the 
contract by the President.  Id. at 1216.  The court reasoned that Dage-MTI’s President acted 
as Dage-MTI’s agent, possessed inherent authority and, therefore, bound the company.  Id. 
at 1216.  The court further reasoned that the President had inherent authority because he 
acted within the usual and ordinary scope of his authority, Menard reasonably believed the 
President to have the authority, and Menard had no notice that the President’s actions were 
not authorized.  Id. at 1213-16. 
114 E.g., Kahn v. Royal Banks of Mo., 790 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).  In Kahn, a 
dispute arose over whether a husband and wife were jointly liable for a loan the husband 
secured on both of their behalves.  Id. at 506.  The wife had signed a power of attorney 
giving the husband the right to act on her behalf.  Id.  However, when the bank foreclosed 
on the loan the wife filed suit claiming she was note liable for the debts.  Id.  The wife 
argued that because the husband had acted in self interest and not her interest he was 
acting without authority to bind her to the loans.  Id.  The court held that the husband had 
acted with inherent authority and therefore held the wife jointly liable for the debt.  Id. at 
509.  Due to the fact that the bank was unaware that the husband was breaching his 
fiduciary duties to his wife, the husband was acting with inherent authority, and therefore 
bound the wife as principal to the husband’s dealings with the bank, a third party.  Id. 
115 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A. 
Inherent agency power is a term used in the restatement of this subject 
to indicate the power of an agent which is derived not from authority, 
apparent authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency relation and 
exists for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with a 
servant or other agent. 
Id. 
116 Gregory Scott Crespi, The Proposed Abolition of Inherent Agency Authority by the 
Restatement (Third) Of Agency: An Incomplete Solution, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 344 
(2005) (discussing section 8A comment a of the Restatement Second of Agency). 
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other areas.117  For that reason this note will not discuss the doctrine 
further.118 
C. An Alternate Theory for Binding a Principal:  Estoppel 
Beyond the “traditional” concepts of agency and authority, both the 
Restatement Second and Restatement Third contain a section on estoppel.119  
In agency law, estoppel is viewed as a net that allows courts the freedom 
to hold a principal liable in cases where the agent is lacking either an 
agency relationship or authority to bind the principal.120  Estoppel can 
also be used to prevent a principal from denying an agency relationship 
or authority; however, estoppel is preempted by all other doctrines 
contained within the Restatements.121  In order for estoppel to apply, 
therefore, courts must be sure that no other doctrines within the 
Restatements apply.  Part II.C scrutinizes the doctrine of estoppel by 
examining its requirements under the Restatements, how it has been used 
by the courts, and how it is distinguished from similar concepts like 
perceived agency and apparent authority.122 
The doctrine of estoppel is deeply rooted in American and English 
jurisprudence.123  Several treatises on the subject provide a good 
background of the topic.124  However, for purposes of agency law, 
estoppel is defined in section 8b of the Restatement Second and section 
2.05 of the Restatement Third.125   
                                                 
117 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2 intro. note; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
parallel tbls (2006); see Crespi, supra note 116, at 344 (discussing section 8A comment a of 
Restatement Second of Agency). 
118 See Crespi, supra note 116; Matthew P. Ward, A Restatement or a Redefinition: 
Elimination Of Inherent Agency in the Tentative Draft of The Restatement (Third) Of Agency, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1585 (2002) (discussing the American Law Institute’s decision to 
eliminate the doctrine of inherent authority from the Restatement Third). 
119 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8b. 
120 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2 int. nt. 4 (2006). 
121 Id. 
122 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing agency law’s treatment of estoppel generally and 
specifically the doctrine of agency by estoppel). 
123 As such, an attempt to give adequate depth to the history of the doctrine in this Note 
would be both an exercise in futility and well beyond the scope of this Note. 
124 See generally ELIZABETH COOKE, THE MODERN LAW OF ESTOPPEL (Oxford University 
Press 2000); ALEXANDER KINGCOME TURNER, THE LAW RELATING TO ESTOPPEL BY 
REPRESENTATION (Butterworths & Co. 1966). 
125 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05. 
A person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has authority 
as an agent and who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction 
purportedly done by the actor on that person’s account is subject to 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/10
2007] The Double Doctrine Agent 361 
Under the Restatement Second, an individual is estopped from 
denying an agency relationship if he intentionally or carelessly caused a 
belief in a third person that one is acting on his behalf or, knowing of the 
belief, failed to correct the mistake and caused the third party to change 
position in reliance on that belief.126  As at least one jurisdiction in Texas 
has noted, estoppel is closely related to several other agency doctrines.127  
However, to say that the doctrines are equivalent would be incorrect.128  
Apparent authority, for example, is analytically similar to estoppel; 
however, estoppel, as defined in both the Restatement Second and Third, 
does not necessarily require that the third party’s belief be directly 
traceable to the principal in order to apply.129  For instance, in order for 
there to be a claim of apparent authority, the third party’s belief must be 
                                                                                                             
liability to a third party who justifiably is induced to make a 
detrimental change in position because the transaction is believed to be 
on the person’s account, if 
(1) the person intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or 
(2) having notice of such belief and that it might induce others to 
change their positions, the person did not take reasonable steps to 
notify them of the facts. 
Id.  Further: 
(1) A person who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction 
purported to be done on his account, is nevertheless subject to liability 
to persons who have changed their positions because of their belief 
that the transaction was entered into by or for him, if 
(a) he intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or 
(b) knowing of such belief and that others might change their positions 
because of it, he did not take reasonable steps to notify them of the 
facts. 
(2) An owner of property who represents to third persons that another 
is the owner of the property or who permits the other so to represent, 
or who realizes that third persons believe that another is the owner of 
the property, and that he could easily inform the third persons of the 
facts, is subject to the loss of the property if the other disposes of it to 
third persons who, in ignorance of the facts, purchase the property or 
otherwise change their position with reference to it. 
(3) Change of position, as the phrase is used in the restatement of this 
subject, indicates payment of money, expenditure of labor, suffering a 
loss or subjection to legal liability. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8b (1958). 
126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8b. 
127 Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 n.2 (Tex. 1998) (“Many 
courts use the terms ostensible agency, apparent agency, apparent authority, and agency 
by estoppel interchangeably.  As a practical matter, there is no distinction among them.”). 
128 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 cmt c (discussing how estoppel is different 
than the doctrines of actual and apparent authority). 
129 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 cmt. d (discussing that estoppel applies even 
in cases where a third party belief is not directly traceable to the principal). 
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traceable to a manifestation on the part of the principal.130  Estoppel, on 
the other hand, does not require as close a fit between the third party’s 
belief and the principal.131   
Hoddeson v. Koos Bros.,132 which is the basis for Illustration Two from 
the Restatement Third section 2.05, was the first case to use agency by 
estoppel to confer liability.133  In Hoddeson, Ms. Hoddeson entered a 
furniture store owned by Koos Brothers to make a purchase.134  While in 
the store, Ms. Hoddeson was approached by a man who appeared to 
work for Koos Brothers.135  The man then proceeded to take notes, 
presumably recording her order, as Ms. Hoddeson selected furniture to 
purchase.136  At the end of the discussion, Ms. Hoddeson paid for the 
furniture and left the store.137  After waiting for a period of time past the 
expected delivery date, Ms. Hoddeson went back to the store to inquire 
what was causing the delay.138  When she returned, Koos Brothers’ 
employees informed her that they had no record of the transaction.139  It 
was assumed that the man who had helped her had not been a member 
                                                 
130 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03. 
131 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 cmt. d. 
132 135 A.2d 702 (N.J. 1957). 
133 Id; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 illus. 2 (2006).  Illustration 2 states: 
P owns a large retail furniture store, known as “P’s Furniture 
Emporium.” P, who is often absent from the premises, does not 
otherwise maintain surveillance over the store’s sales force.  T, a 
prospective customer, enters the store and is approached by A, whose 
demeanor and attire lend A the appearance of a salesperson.  After 
examining floor samples, T purchases several items of furniture for 
cash, giving the cash to A.  A gives T a receipt written on a standard-
looking form, with “P’s Furniture Emporium” printed at the top.  A 
explains to T that the items purchased are not presently in inventory 
but will be delivered to T’s home within two weeks.  A is an imposter 
who is not an employee or other agent of P. A does not remit any of 
the cash paid by T to P.  No furniture is delivered to T.  T’s change of 
position is justified by T’s belief that A is what A purports to be, a 
salesperson with authority to sell from P’s inventory.  Whether P may 
deny A’s authority is a question for the trier of fact. 
134 Hoddeson, 135 A.2d at 703. 
135 Id.  The man was dressed in a suit, and as he approach he asked her if he could be of 
some help.  Id. 
136 Id. at 704. 
137 Id.  The man informed Ms. Hoddeson that the furniture she had picked out was not in 
stock and would have to be shipped to her.  Id.  Ms. Hoddeson then gave the man $168.50 
in payment for the items and left the store without receiving a receipt.  Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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of the sales staff at all.140  The court remanded the case based on a lack of 
evidence and findings by the lower court to hold that the “apparent” 
salesman was an agent with any kind of authority to bind the furniture 
store.141  However, the court held that under a theory of estoppel, 
regardless of whether the salesman had authority, the furniture store 
could not escape liability by disavowing an agency relationship where it 
had failed to adequately protect its customers from people falsely 
pretending to be salesmen.142 
Another distinction among estoppel, apparent authority, and 
perceived agency is the level of reliance required.143  Most jurisdictions 
only require justifiable reliance in cases where an actual agency 
relationship is lacking.144  However, at least one jurisdiction, Illinois, has 
adopted estoppel and its requisite detrimental reliance/change of 
position where an actual agency relationship does not exist.145 
In Gasbarra v. St. James Hospital,146 the plaintiff sued a hospital for 
improper care by physicians in the hospital’s emergency room.147  The 
hospital asserted, as a defense, that it could not be held liable because the 
physicians were independent contractors.148  In response, the plaintiff 
claimed that, despite the lack of actual agency, the hospital was liable 
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.149  The court held that there 
were insufficient grounds to hold the hospital liable under the doctrine 
                                                 
140 Id.  Both Ms. Hoddeson and her aunt, who had accompanied her on the day of the 
purchase, were unable to positively identify the man who had helped them from the 
regular sales staff that worked at the store.  Id.  Both did acknowledge that one man bore a 
resemblance to the man that had helped them but a subsequent examination of Koos 
Brothers records showed the identified man was on vacation the day the women were in 
the store.  Id. 
141 Id. at 706. 
142 Id. at 706-07. 
143 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (stating reliance as “. . . a third party who 
justifiably is induced to make a detrimental change in position because the transaction is 
believed to be on the person’s account. . . ”); see also supra note 97 and accompanying text; 
supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra Part II.A.2. 
145 Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 406 N.E.2d 544, 554-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
146 Id.; see also Keith Phoenix & Anne L. Schlueter, Hospital Liability for the Acts of 
Independent Contractors: The Ostensible Agency Doctrine, 30 St. LOUIS U. L.J. 875, 885 (1986) 
(discussing the facts and holding in Gasbarra). 
147 Gasbarra, 406 N.E.2d at 548. 
148 Id.  The emergency room physicians were employed by the Doctors Emergency Care 
Association and were independent contractors not employee agents of the hospital.  Id. 
149 Id. at 554. 
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of estoppel because the plaintiff failed to show any detrimental change of 
position.150 
Estoppel is distinct from apparent authority and perceived agency 
because estoppel, as applied by most jurisdictions, requires a more 
stringent form of reliance.151  Furthermore, the Restatement Third 
Introductory Note Four demonstrates that apparent authority and 
estoppel are related but separate doctrines, stating:   
Estoppel is relevant to agency when a representation is 
made that one person has authority to act on behalf of 
another.  In this Restatement, when doctrines other than 
estoppel are applicable to a situation, those doctrines 
govern.  Unlike many cases, but like Restatement 
Second, Agency, this Restatement treats apparent 
authority as a doctrine distinct from estoppel.  It does so 
to clarify the law and to make clear when and why it is 
necessary for a plaintiff to show detrimental reliance.152 
By asserting that agency doctrines preempt the doctrine of estoppel, the 
Restatement Third recognizes that estoppel’s applicability, as defined in 
that Restatement, overlaps the applicability of apparent authority and 
perceived agency to hold a person liable for the acts of another.153 
The law of agency embodies concepts from several areas of law 
including but not limited to torts and contracts.154  As a result, there has 
been much confusion over which doctrines apply in different 
circumstances.155  However, while the Restatement Third is a useful tool to 
help guide courts in evaluating agency problems, it is a secondary source 
and as such should not stand in the way of a court’s ability to find a 
result that is equitable and just. 
                                                 
150 Id. at 555.  The court reasoned that the facts supported the conclusion that the plaintiff 
relied on the manifestations of the hospital; however, the plaintiff had failed to present any 
evidence that she changed her position (i.e. failed to take her child to another hospital) 
which is required to support an estoppel claim.  Id. 
151 See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text (explaining the how estoppel requires a 
more stringent form of reliance than the doctrines of apparent authority and perceived 
agency). 
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2 int. nt. 4 (2006) (detrimental reliance is required 
by estoppel unlike apparent authority which only requires justifiable reliance). 
153 Id. 
154 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY. 
155 See supra Part II. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
The doctrine of perceived agency embodies characteristics  similar to 
estoppel.156  Thus, what is the significant difference between estoppel 
and perceived agency?  As a corollary, should courts retain both 
doctrines?  An examination of cases interpreting these doctrines shows 
that the major distinguishing characteristic embodied in Restatement 
Second sections 267 and 8b, respectively, is the reliance required by each 
doctrine.157  Under perceived agency, a plaintiff is only required to show 
that he justifiably relied upon the manifestations of the principal when 
dealing with an agent.158  By comparison, under the doctrine of agency 
by estoppel, a plaintiff is required to show that he was justified in relying 
upon the principal’s manifestations and that he changed his position 
based upon that reliance.159  It is clear that there is a need for an agency 
doctrine which protects third parties who rely on manifestations by a 
principal that another is their agent.  However, the doctrines must be 
flexible enough to protect consumers, while not discouraging business 
from working together in new and creative ways.  Requiring detrimental 
reliance in cases of third party reliance where no agency relationship 
exists will do just that. 
One scholar, Joseph H. King, argues that the reliance required by 
perceived agency is, in fact, the detrimental reliance of estoppel.160  
However, the Michigan Court of Appeals is the only authority King cites 
concluding that courts require such detrimental reliance in perceived 
agency cases. 161  Yet, a close examination of that case reveals another 
interpretation.162  The vast majority of cases relying on the Restatement 
                                                 
156 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
157 See infra Part III.  See generally, 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2, 474-
75. 
158 See generally, 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2, 474-75. 
159 Id. 
160 Joseph H. King Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of Their 
Franchisees, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 417, 446-56 (2005).  Mr. King argues that perceived 
agency requires four prongs of reliance: Actual Reliance; Actually Attaching Importance to 
the Manifestation; Justified in Believing the Truth of the Manifestation; and Justified in 
Attaching Importance to the Manifestation.  Id. at 448-59.  He further argues that Actually 
Attaching Importance to the Manifestations is the detrimental reliance prong of perceived 
agency reliance.  Id. at 449-56. 
161 Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). 
162 See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (examining the holding in Little v. 
Howard Johnson and arguing that the court did not actually require detrimental reliance 
change of position). 
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Second section 267 only require justifiable reliance.163  The different levels 
of reliance would not be troublesome except that nearly every instance in 
which a court relies on section 267 to impart liability could just as easily 
fall under section 8b estoppel.164  Further, the Restatement Third failed to 
fix the problem when it maintained the distinction between perceived 
agency and agency by estoppel.165  Because the language of Restatement 
Second section 267 was retained almost completely in Restatement Third 
section 7.07 Comment f, courts choosing to adopt the Restatement Third 
can maintain the distinction between justifiable and detrimental 
reliance.166  Part III.A of this Note analyzes how courts have discussed 
and utilized the Restatement Second in determining liability for Employers 
and Franchisors.  Part III.B examines how applying sections 7.07 and 2.05 
of the Restatement Third may alter a court’s analysis of employer and 
franchisor liability. 
A. Restatement Second: A Confusion of Doctrines by the Courts 
1. Employer – Employee Relationships 
One of the two broad circumstances in which courts have applied 
agency by estoppel or perceived agency is when the third party believed 
the person was an employee of the principal and, therefore, believed the 
person to be an agent of the principal.  Although only moderately 
common, this situation has the capability of arising in an enormous 
number of settings.  Part III.A.1.a. examines the courts reasoning in the 
watershed case for using agency by estoppel to impart liability, Hoddeson 
v. Koos Bros.167  Part III.A.1.b. analyzes courts’ decisions on conferring 
liability to hospitals for the acts of independent contractor physicians.168  
                                                 
163 See supra notes 46-57 (discussing the reliance required for perceived agency); see also 6 
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Apparent Agency § 2 at 476-77. 
164 See infra Parts III.A, III.B. 
165 See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (examining how the Restatement Third 
altered the doctrine of perceived agency’s language from the Restatement Second); supra Part 
II.C. (reviewing the Restatement Second and Third’s treatment of estoppel). 
166 See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (considering a court’s options for 
applying Restatement Third § 7.07). 
167 See infra Part III.A.1.a (breaking down the court’s reasoning in Hoddeson and 
hypothecating reasons for the courts lack of discussion on detrimental reliance). 
168 See infra Part III.A.1.b (comparing reasoning in applying agency by estoppel or 
perceived agency in cases of torts committed by independent contractor physicians). 
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a. Salesmen:  Attempts to Define a Doctrine 
The seminal case for using estoppel to hold a business responsible 
for the acts of an apparent salesman is Hoddeson v. Koos Bros.169  The 
Hoddeson court remanded the case, making no finding as to whether the 
furniture store was actually estopped from denying the agency 
relationship.170  However, the court reasoned that agency by estoppel 
may be appropriate in these types of cases.171  Although the court’s 
reasoning followed that of the Restatement Second, sections 8b and 267, 
noticeably missing from the court’s discussion was the degree of reliance 
required.  The court only indirectly mentioned the degree of reliance by 
stating that the principal should be estopped if the acts of the perceived 
agent would lead a person of “ordinary prudence and circumspection to 
believe that the imposter was . . . the proprietor’s agent.”172  This 
description of reliance lacks the detrimental reliance change of position 
language, which is the touchstone of estoppel analysis.173  The omission 
of the detrimental reliance language is likely the product of two factors.  
First, the facts of Hoddeson demonstrate so clearly that there was 
detrimental reliance that it was likely uncontested by the defendant and, 
as such, the court did not feel compelled to discuss it in the case.174  
Second, Hoddeson was decided a year before the Restatement Second was 
published, and the Restatement (First) of Agency did not include a section 
on estoppel.175  The combination of Ms. Hoddeson’s obvious change of 
position with no Restatement section expressly requiring detrimental 
                                                 
169 See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of 
Hoddeson v. Koos. Brothers). 
170 Hoddeson v. Koos Bros., 135 A.2d 702 (N.J. 1957). 
171 Id. at 707. 
[W]here a proprietor of a place of business by his dereliction of duty 
enables one who is not his agent conspicuously to act as such and 
ostensibly to transact the proprietor’s business with a patron in the 
establishment, the appearances being of such a character as to lead a 
person of ordinary prudence and circumspection to believe that the 
impostor was in truth the proprietor’s agent, in such circumstances the 
law will not permit the proprietor defensively to avail himself of the 
impostor’s lack of authority and thus escape liability for the 
consequential loss thereby sustained by the customer. 
Id. 
172 Id. 
173 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.  It is uncontestable that had Ms. Hoddeson 
known the “salesman” that approached her in the store that day was not really an 
employee of Koos Brothers, she would not have placed her order and given him the 
money. 
175 See generally, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY (1933). 
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reliance likely led the court to omit any meaningful discussion of the 
reliance required by agency by estoppel. 
b. Independent Contractor Physicians:  Uncertainty in Choosing a Doctrine 
Courts’ treatment of the relationship between hospitals and their 
independent contractor physicians varies by jurisdiction.176  Most 
jurisdictions use perceived agency to confer liability on hospitals; 
however, a minority of jurisdictions, most notably Illinois, rejected 
perceived agency in favor of using agency by estoppel.177  Because of the 
additional requirement of change of position, it is much harder for a 
plaintiff to prevail in jurisdictions that use agency by estoppel.178  
Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center179 and Gasbarra v. St. James Hospital 
demonstrate the different ways courts have examined the relationship 
between a hospital and its independent contractor physicians.180 
When courts apply the Restatement Second section 267 in an 
employer-employee relationship, change of position is not required in 
order to have a valid claim.181  In applying the doctrine of perceived 
agency to the facts, the St. Claire Medical Center court recognized that, by 
failing to give the plaintiff notice that the anesthesiologist was not an 
employee of the hospital, it held him out as such.182  Further, in 
discussing the plaintiff’s reliance, the court stated that the plaintiff’s 
belief that the anesthesiologist was an employee of the hospital was 
                                                 
176 See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra Part II.A.2; see also Ferraro and Camarra, Hospital Liability: Apparent Agency or 
Agency by Estoppel, 76 ILL. B.J. 364 (1988) (discussing Illinois’ refusal to follow other 
jurisdictions’ lead of adopting perceived agency in hospital liability cases).  But see 
Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 406 N.E.2d 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (supp. opinion). 
178 See infra notes 235-38 (discussing the difficulties of bringing a claim that requires 
change of position); see also Phoenix & Schlueter, supra note 147, at 885.  They state: 
the most difficult aspect of the [agency by estoppel] theory from the 
plaintiff’s perspective is the inherent proof problem.  To recover under 
this doctrine, a plaintiff must establish . . . that the representation 
caused the plaintiff’s reliance on the care or skill of the apparent agent 
to the plaintiff’s detriment. 
Phoenix & Schlueter, supra note 147, at 885. 
179 Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center, 657 S.W.2d 590, 596 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983). 
180 See infra notes 182-90 and accompanying text (describing how courts treated hospital 
liability differently in the case of independent contractor physicians). 
181 St. Claire, 657 S.W.2d at 592.  The hospital denied liability on the basis that the surgeon 
and nurse who administered the anesthetics were independent contractors and the hospital 
was not vicariously liable for their acts.  The court disagreed and stated that the hospital 
could be held liable under perceived agency as set forth in the Restatement Second.  Id. 
182 Id. 
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justifiable, omitting any discussion of change of position.183  By contrast, 
Illinois has rejected the use of perceived agency in the context of hospital 
liability.184 
In Gasbarra, the plaintiff sought recovery for the malpractice of a 
physician that resulted in the death of her child.185  In a supplemental 
opinion, the court discussed the plaintiff’s agency claim.186  The court 
found that no actual agency relationship existed, and without mention of 
perceived agency, rejected the plaintiff’s claim for agency by estoppel.187  
In finding that there was no merit to the plaintiff’s claim for agency by 
estoppel, the court stated that the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence 
in the record that suggested she changed her position based on a belief 
that the emergency room physicians were employees of the hospital.188  
In other words, the plaintiff failed to show evidence that if she had 
known the physicians were not employees of the hospital she would 
have chosen to take her child to another hospital.189  Accordingly, 
requiring change of position in this context makes it much harder for 
plaintiffs to hold hospitals vicariously liable for the acts of their 
independent contractor physicians.190   
2. Franchisor – Franchisee Relationships 
Despite the fact that Illinois courts have used agency by estoppel and 
rejected perceived agency in one context, no jurisdiction has been willing 
to apply agency by estoppel to franchisor-franchisee relationships.191  
Franchisor–franchisee relationships are present in a wide variety of 
business enterprises, and imposition of liability on franchisors for the 
acts of franchisees, absent actual agency, has been commonly based upon 
section 267 of the Restatement Second.192  Furthermore, as the Oregon 
                                                 
183 Id. 
184 Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 406 N.E.2d 544, 548 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that 
Illinois rejects the justifiable reliance required by other states and dismisses Gasbarra’s 
claim of perceived agency on grounds that she has failed to show a detrimental reliance 
change of position). 
185 See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. 
186 Gasbarra, 406 N.E.2d at 553. 
187 Id. at 554-55. 
188 Id. at 555. 
189 Id. 
190 See supra note 178. 
191 See infra Part III.A.2. 
192 See Randall K. Hanson, The Franchising Dilemma: Franchisor Liability for Action of a Local 
Franchisee, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J. 190, 198 (1991) [hereinafter Dilemma]; Randall K. Hanson, The 
Franchising Dilemma Continues: Update on Franchisor Liability for Wrongful Acts By Local 
Franchisees, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 91, 99-100 (1997) [hereinafter Continues]. 
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Court of Appeals reasoned in Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., “[t]he crucial 
issues are whether the putative principal held the third party out as an 
agent and whether the plaintiff relied on that holding out.”193   
Courts consider a variety of factors to find that a franchisor has 
“held out” a franchisee as its agent.194  Among those factors courts have 
most notably deliberated are the effects of a franchisor’s national 
advertising and a franchisee’s use of the franchisor’s name and insignia 
on signs and other displays in the store.195  As to the question of reliance, 
courts have almost uniformly announced and applied the requirement of 
justifiable reliance rather than detrimental reliance/change of position.196 
The lone case which applies Restatement Second section 267 and 
expressly states that change of position is required is Crinkley v. Holiday 
Inns, Inc.197  However, as the court applied the test for perceived agency, 
the requirement of change of position was absent.198  The court reviewed 
the evidence and found plenty of support for the notion that the 
Crinkleys had actually relied on Holiday Inn, Inc.’s representations.199  
However, the court did not mention any testimony or evidence that the 
Crinkley’s would have chosen not to stay at the Holiday Inn had they 
been informed that the Hotel was owned and operated by anyone other 
than Holiday Inn, Inc.  Thus, while the court claimed to be requiring 
detrimental reliance/change of position of the plaintiffs, in reality it 
applied the lower standard of justifiable reliance.   
Little v. Howard Johnson Co. is another case often cited as an example 
of a court requiring detrimental reliance/change of position in perceived 
agency analysis.200  The belief that the court required detrimental 
reliance/change of position is based on the court’s statement, “[h]ere, 
plaintiff has failed to offer any documentary evidence that she was 
                                                 
193 Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1112 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). 
194 King, supra note 161 at 441. 
195 Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 1988) (relying on national 
advertising to establish a holding out); Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 199 
(Del. 1978) (relying on franchisor’s requirement that franchisee use the franchisor’s trade 
name and insignia); Gizzi v. Texaco, 437 F.2d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 1971) (relying on national 
advertising to establish a holding out). 
196 See supra Part II.A.2. 
197 844 F.2d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 1988). 
198 Id. at 167. 
199 Id. (stating the Crinkleys chose to find another Holiday Inn when there was no room 
at a Holiday Inn close to there destination.  Also noting Mr. Crinkley’s testimony that he 
was surprised to find out that Holiday Inn, Inc. was not involved in the operation of the 
hotel). 
200 Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). 
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harmed as a result of relying on the perceived fact that the franchisee 
was an agent of defendant.”201  Taken by itself, the court’s statement 
appears to suggest that detrimental reliance/change of position is 
required.  However, when viewed in light of the facts of the case, 
another reading emerges.202   
Little involved a restaurant customer slipping and falling on an icy 
sidewalk.203  Arguably, the conditions which caused the plaintiff’s injury 
were completely unrelated to the aspects of the restaurant that the 
franchisor would have promoted, as uniform to the franchise, to 
encourage patronage to member franchisees.204  When considered in 
conjunction with the surrounding facts, the court’s language requires 
that the instrument which injures a plaintiff must be part of the holding 
out by the franchisor upon which the plaintiff relied.205  In many cases, 
this requirement is inherently fulfilled, as in the case Miller v. McDonald’s 
Corp.   
In Miller, the plaintiff was injured from biting into a sapphire that 
was inside her sandwich.206  In finding a perceived agency relationship, 
the court recognized that McDonald’s use of uniform menus, food 
production methods, and service standards, constituted a holding out of 
the franchisee as McDonald’s agent.207  While not discussed in the case, it 
is self-evident that the instrumentality which caused plaintiff’s injury, 
the food, was part and parcel of the representations made by the 
franchisor and relied upon by the plaintiff.208  It may be, as King 
suggests, that requiring a close fit between the instrumentality of injury 
and the manifestations by the principal would fulfill a detrimental 
reliance requirement in cases where the plaintiff is injured by an 
                                                 
201 See King, supra note 161, at 445-46. 
202 See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text. 
203 Id. at 392. 
204 Although the court makes no finding as to this point, it seems unlikely that Little 
would have chosen to eat at the Howard Johnson restaurant because she expected that 
restaurants in Howard Johnson hotels are more or less likely to have their sidewalks 
properly cleared. 
205 See King, supra note 161, at 452 (stating “one relying on apparent agency should 
similarly have to prove justifiable reliance not merely on a manifestation of agency, but 
agency with respect to, again, the specific injurious instrument or conduct responsible for 
the harm in question”). 
206 Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). 
207 Id. at 1113. 
208 See generally King, supra note 161, at 452 (arguing that courts should require a 
plaintiff’s reliance to be tied to a belief that the franchisor had control of the instrumentality 
that caused the injury but failing to distinguish how doing so would fulfill a detrimental 
reliance or change of position requirement). 
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instrumentality that is not part of the principal’s manifestation.  
However, in cases like Miller, findings that the plaintiff was injured by 
an instrumentality which was part of the principal’s manifestations fail 
to bring a court any closer to determining whether the plaintiff has 
detrimentally relied.209  Therefore, combining those two concepts runs 
the risk of further muddling an already cloudy area of agency law.210 
Beyond Miller and Little, courts from a wide range of jurisdictions 
have explicitly stated that the only reliance required to hold a franchisor 
liable for the acts of a franchisee is justifiable reliance.211  In doing so, 
courts have equated enticement with reliance and found franchisors 
liable based solely on the plaintiff’s testimony that they chose to do 
business with the franchisee because they thought they were dealing 
with the franchisor.212  However, noticeably lacking in all of the 
                                                 
209 See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text. 
210 But see King, supra note 161, at 445-46 (discussing Little v. Howard Johnson Co. and 
contending that the case requires detrimental reliance change of position). 
211 See generally McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d at 1113; Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 
A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978); Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308, 309 (3d Cir. 1971). 
212 Billops, 391 A.2d at 199. 
Plaintiffs have presented evidence of their reliance on Hilton as a 
“quality enterprise”.  Depositions of several of the plaintiffs produced 
the following testimony: By Mr. Billops: “. . . we did go to the Hilton 
Hotel for the evening and the people paid $10.00 for the event and not 
this shabby treatment . . .”  By Mr. Naylor: “We received letters from 
the Hilton, signed by Parker [the banquet director] that they were 
happy that we had picked their hotel to have our affair in.  And we 
said now we have got a first class hotel with a first class affair.  That is 
why we charged $10.00 in advance.. . . that night the treatment of 
Parker and the attitude of the personnel at that point, it so alarmed me 
that it broke my heart because I put a lot of faith and trust into the 
Hilton, because it was a major hotel . . . .”  These are statements of 
express reliance on the Hilton name, and the quality it represents. 
Id.; see also Crinkley, 844 F.2d at 167. 
As to the reliance prong of the test, Sarah Crinkley testified that she 
and her husband had previously stayed at Holiday Inns and that she 
was familiar with its national advertising.  She also testified that they 
originally attempted to make reservations at a Holiday Inn in 
Charlotte because they thought it would be a good place to stay.  
Rather than looking for another Charlotte area hotel when they could 
not get a room at the Holiday Inn near their destination, they used a 
Holiday Inn directory to find another convenient motel.  James 
Crinkley testified that he did not know the difference between a 
franchise inn and a company owned inn at the time . . . and noted that 
he would be greatly surprised to find out that Holiday Inns was not 
involved in the operation of the Holiday Inn-Concord beyond the 
franchise agreement.  While the Crinkleys’ evidence of actual reliance 
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franchisor-franchisee cases is any evidence that the plaintiffs have given 
up an alternative opportunity they would have taken had they known 
the business was not run by the franchisor.  Further, without such 
evidence, it is unclear how a plaintiff can claim that he was injured by 
the franchisor’s representations.  Given this understanding of how courts 
have applied the doctrines of perceived agency and agency by estoppel 
under the Restatement Second, courts will be faced with the decision of 
which doctrine to use under the Restatement Third.213 
B. Restatement Third:  Attempting to Streamline the Law 
As previously discussed, the Restatement Third contains similar 
language to the Restatement Second in the areas of perceived agency and 
agency by estoppel.214  As a result, courts in jurisdictions where the 
Restatement Third is adopted will have a choice of which doctrine to use 
when faced with agency cases involving employer-employee and 
franchisor-franchisee relationships. 
1. Employer-Employee Relationship Under Restatement Third section 
7.07 
Because Restatement Third, section 7.07 Comment f retains much of 
the same language as Restatement Second, section 267, courts in 
jurisdictions where the Restatement Third has been adopted can use 
section 7.07 and apply the same analysis as courts did under the 
Restatement Second.215  In fact, the Restatement Third’s change of language, 
if anything, makes it more explicit that section 7.07 Comment f is meant 
to be used in the employer-employee context.216  Therefore, in applying it 
to the facts in the various hospital contexts, the court would conduct the 
same analysis as under the Restatement Second.217   
Under this analysis, the first question would be, did the principal 
hold out the agent as its employee?218  Secondly, did the plaintiff rely on 
                                                                                                             
may be marginal, we think it sufficed under the applicable substantive 
principles to raise a jury issue. 
Crinkley, 844 F.2d at 167. 
213 See infra Part III.B. 
214 See supra Parts II.A.2 (perceived agency), II.C.1 (agency by estoppel). 
215 See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing the language change from 
Restatement Second § 267 to Restatement Third §7.07 Comment f). 
216 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (explaining the change in language from 
master-servant to employer-employee in Restatement Third Section 7.07 Comment f). 
217 See supra notes 180-93 and accompanying text. 
218 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing the holding out requirement 
for perceived agency as applied in Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc.). 
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the holding out of the principal?219  Finally, was the plaintiff’s reliance 
reasonable and justifiable?220  If the answer is “yes” to all three questions, 
then the principal is liable, but, if the answer is “no” to any of these 
factors, the principal is not liable.221   
Yet, while the change in language from section 267 to the language 
of section 7.07 is insignificant in dealing with employer-employee 
relationships, it is significant in the context of franchisor-franchisee 
relationships.222 
2. Franchisor-Franchisee Relationships Under Restatement Third section 
7.07 Comment f 
Courts routinely relied on the Restatement Second section 267 to 
impose liability upon franchisors for the misdeeds of their franchisees.223  
However, while the franchisor-franchisee relationship certainly fits 
within the language of section 267 as a master-servant relationship, 
section 7.07 Comment f’s use of employer-employee language may 
become a pitfall for unsuspecting practitioners.  In order to fall within 
the reach of section 7.07 Comment f, an attorney will have to give an 
employer-employee basis for asserting vicarious liability.224  Because 
franchisees are not generally considered employees of franchisors, 
practitioners will have to draw their complaints carefully, asserting that 
the tortious acts of the franchisee employee should be imputed to the 
franchisor, because the franchisor held out all employees of the 
franchisee as employees of the franchisor.225   
Applying this idea to the facts of Miller v. McDonald’s, the plaintiff 
would have to draw her complaint carefully, asserting that McDonald’s 
Corporation held out all workers at McDonald’s restaurants as being 
employed by McDonald’s Corporation; and, as such, McDonald’s 
Corporation should be vicariously liable for the acts of all McDonald’s 
employees.  Once that is established, the court could use the same 
                                                 
219 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
220 See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing the reliance requirement for 
perceived agency as applied in Miller v. McDonald’s Corporation). 
221 See supra Part II.A.2. 
222 See supra Part II.A.2; see also, Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1997).  “The relationship between two business entities is not precisely an 
employment relationship.”  Id. 
223 See supra Part II.A.2 (demonstrating how courts have used perceived agency to apply 
liability to restaurant and hotel franchisors). 
224 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006). 
225 See supra note 223. 
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analysis as it would under Restatement Second section 267 to impute 
liability upon the franchisor.226  Conversely, some courts may be 
unwilling to extend the language of section 7.07 Comment f to 
franchisor-franchisee relationships, in which case the court may look to 
section 2.05 to decide franchisor liability. 
3. Franchisor-Franchisee Relationships Under Restatement Third Section 
2.05 
Section 8b of the Restatement Second is embodied in section 2.05 of the 
Restatement Third.227  Although the language of section 2.05 looks as if it 
contains an internal inconsistency, it appears to operate in the same 
manner as section 8b.228  Therefore, courts applying section 2.05 in either 
the employer-employee or the franchisor-franchisee relationship should 
require evidence that the principal caused the third party to believe the 
other was his agent and that the third party justifiably and detrimentally 
changed position as a result of the belief.229  Applying the doctrine of 
agency by estoppel in both the employer-employee and franchisor-
franchisee relationship would be a departure from precedent for most 
jurisdictions.230  However, the shift from perceived agency to agency by 
estoppel would prevent some of the abuse caused by plaintiffs seeking 
“deep pockets” to sue.231 
                                                 
226 See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text (describing the courts analysis to find a 
holding out by the defendant and justifiable reliance by the plaintiff). 
227 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY parallel tbls. at 482. 
228 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 begins with the opening clause: 
A person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has authority 
as an agent and who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction 
purportedly done by the actor on that person’s account is subject to 
liability to a third party who justifiably is induced to make a 
detrimental change in position because the transaction is believed to be 
on the person’s account, if 
(1) the person intentionally or carelessly caused such belief. . . 
Id.  The phrase “[a] person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has authority as 
an agent” is new to the Restatement’s section on estoppel.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 8b (1958).  However, Section 2.05 (1) says the principle will be liable if the 
principal causes a belief in the third party that another is his agent.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2.05.  Therefore, in order for Section 2.05 to apply, the principal 
must not make a manifestation that a person is an agent, but has to intentionally cause the 
third party to believe the agent has authority.  This inconsistence becomes irreconcilable 
when examined in light of the Restatement Third’s expansive view of manifestation. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03. 
229 See supra Part II.C.1. 
230 See supra Parts II.A.2, II.C.1. 
231 Dilemma, supra note 193, at 192-94 (discussing the reasons asserted for expanding and 
limiting franchisor liability); King, supra note 161, at 465-84 (stating and discussing 
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As previously discussed, the difference between perceived agency 
and agency by estoppel is the level of reliance required by each of the 
doctrines.  Of all the cases examined in this Note, only Gasbarra stated 
that it required agency by estoppel’s detrimental reliance/change of 
position and went on to apply that standard to the facts.232  In all the 
other cases, the record is generally lacking of any evidence that the 
plaintiffs changed position based on the appearance of an agency 
relationship.233 
In Miller v. McDonald, there was evidence that the plaintiff had 
patronized the McDonald’s restaurant in reliance on a reasonable 
expectation about the quality of service at McDonald’s generally.234  
However, there is no evidence that she would have chosen not to 
patronize the restaurant were she aware that McDonald’s Corp. was not 
the owner.  This lack of evidence of a true change of position would 
preclude a plaintiff from recovering from the defendant franchisor under 
the doctrine of agency by estoppel.  Similarly, while the plaintiff in Gizzi 
v. Texaco, Inc. justifiably relied on the manifestations by Texaco that they 
owned the station where he bought his car, there is no evidence that the 
plaintiff would have chosen not to buy the car had he known the station 
was owned by someone other than Texaco.235 
Overall, courts’ adoption of perceived agency in both the employer-
employee and franchisor-franchisee relationships has allowed more 
plaintiffs to recover from the perceived principal than would have under 
the doctrine of agency by estoppel.236  Further, while there are justifiable 
concerns about leaving a plaintiff without a remedy, courts should be 
wary of being too lenient in allowing plaintiffs to recover without 
                                                                                                             
“Consistency and Predictability,” “Modern Irrelevance of the Historical Underpinnings of 
Vicarious Liability,” “Dilemmas of Franchisors,” “Loss Prevention, Risk Reduction, and 
Incentives,” “Loss Spreading,” “Loss Allocation,” “Corrective Justice,” “Deep Pocket 
[Hunting],” “Administrative Costs,” “Fairness,” and “Autonomy and Freedom of 
Enterprise and to Contract” as reasons for limiting franchisor liability) (alteration in the 
original). 
232 See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra notes 32, 41 and accompanying text (discussing the cases Miller v. 
McDonald’s Corporation, Crinkley v. Holiday Inns Inc., Gizzi v. Texaco Inc. and Billops v. 
Magness Constr. Co.). 
234 Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). 
235 Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 1971) (recounting Gizzi’s testimony 
“[a]ppellant Gizzi testified that he was aware of the advertising engaged in by Texaco and 
that it had instilled in him a certain sense of confidence in the corporation and its 
products.”). 
236 See supra Part III. 
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establishing that they were injured by conduct of the “principal.”237  By 
not requiring detrimental reliance/change of position, courts allow 
plaintiffs to recover for conduct that they would have undertaken 
regardless of the manifestations by the “principal.”  Therefore, the best 
way to promote the advantages that result when entities are allowed to 
work together, while protecting the consuming public, is to require 
plaintiffs to show detrimental reliance or change of position when 
asserting a claim under perceived agency and agency by estoppel. 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
As discussed in Part II, courts have been inconsistent and confusing 
in applying the doctrines of perceived agency, agency by estoppel, and 
apparent authority.238  Due to the fact that courts consistently fail to 
differentiate between the doctrines, the law could be clarified by 
eliminating one or more of them.  The question becomes, which doctrine 
should be eliminated?   
Apparent authority should remain in tact because it applies to a 
vastly different situation than the other two doctrines.239  Therefore the 
courts’ interpretation aside, apparent authority is an independently 
important doctrine that serves an indispensable role in agency law.  On 
the other hand, perceived agency and agency by estoppel cover roughly 
the same situation in agency law, and operate in the same way except for 
one respect.240  Furthermore, as discussed in Part III, the doctrine of 
agency by estoppel protects franchisors and employers by requiring the 
plaintiff to show reliance and a change position, typically forgoing the 
choice of the defendant’s competitor if they had known an agency 
relationship did not exist.241  Consequently, this Note suggests removing 
the perceived agency language from the Restatement Third section 7.07 
Comment f and expanding section 2.05 in order for agency by estoppel 
                                                 
237 Dilemma, supra note 193, at 193. 
238 See supra Parts II.A.2 (perceived agency), II.C.1 (agency by estoppel), II.B.2 (apparent 
authority). 
239 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing that apparent authority only applies after an agency 
relationship has been established whereas the other two doctrines impose an agency 
relationship where one did not exist). 
240 Compare Parts II.A.2 (discussing how perceived agency is used to confer liability in the 
absence of an agency relationship where a third party has justifiably relied on the 
appearance of an agency relationship), with Part II.C. (discussing how agency by estoppel 
has been used to confer liability in the absence of an agency relationship where a third 
party has justifiably relied on the appearance of an agency relationship and detrimentally 
changed position based on that reliance). 
241 See supra Part III. 
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to cover the situations which were previously addressed in the 
Restatement Second section 267.242  These changes will streamline the law 
and help guide courts in applying agency by estoppel. 
A. Proposed Amendment to Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 Comment f 
243 
f. Definition of employee.  For purposes of respondeat 
superior, an agent is an employee only when the 
principal controls or has the right to control the manner 
and means through which the agent performs work.  
The definition has the consequence of distinguishing 
between employees and agents who are not employees 
because they retain the right to control how they 
perform their work.  If a person has no right to control 
an actor and exercises no control over the actor, the actor 
is not an agent.  See § 1.01, Comment f(1). 
The fact that an agent performs work gratuitously 
does not relieve a principal of vicarious liability when 
the principal controls or has the right to control the 
manner and means of the agent’s performance of work. 
A person who causes a third party to believe that an 
actor is the person’s employee may be subject to liability 
to the third party for harm caused by the actor when the 
third party justifiably relies on the actor’s skill or care 
and the actor’s conduct, if that of an employee, would be 
within the scope of employment. For the general 
principle of estoppel, see § 2.05.  
B. Commentary 
This revision completely eliminates the Restatement Second’s section 
267 language from the Restatement Third.244  The elimination of perceived 
agency from the Restatement Third will have three main effects.245   
First, eliminating this language will force courts to apply Restatement 
Third section 2.05 in cases where the plaintiff claims a principal is liable 
                                                 
242 See infra Part IV. 
243 The proposals are the contribution of the author.  Specifically, the proposed deletions 
are struck out. 
244 See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement Third’s 
change of the perceived agency language and its possible impacts). 
245 See infra note 247. 
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even though no agency relationship exists.246  Currently, the only ways 
to bind a principal when the requirements for an actual agency do not 
exist, as a matter of law, are to use perceived agency or agency by 
estoppel.247  The elimination of perceived agency forces courts, which 
choose to adopt the Restatement Third, to use agency by estoppel.  
Secondly, this change would result in the creation of a uniform 
standard for imparting liability upon a principal despite the absence of 
an agency relationship.248  As previously discussed, a court’s choice to 
apply either the Restatement Second section 8b or 267 changes the 
required level of reliance.249  Unlike perceived agency, agency by 
estoppel, as embodied in Restatement Third section 2.05, has a clearly 
articulated reliance standard—change of position, along with 
explanation of what fulfills that standard.250  Therefore, by eliminating 
perceived agency from the Restatement Third and promoting the use of 
agency by estoppel, courts will have clearer guidance for what level of 
reliance is required.251 
                                                 
246 Compare Part II.A.2, with Part II.C.1. 
247 See supra Parts II.A, II.C. 
248 See infra notes 250-51. 
249 See supra Part III.A (examining how under the Restatement Second § 267 justifiable 
reliance is required; however, under the Restatement Second Section 8b Detrimental Reliance 
is required). 
250 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (2006): 
§ 2.05 Estoppel To Deny Existence Of Agency Relationship 
A person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has authority 
as an agent and who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction 
purportedly done by the actor on that person’s account is subject to 
liability to a third party who justifiably is induced to make a 
detrimental change in position because the transaction is believed to be 
on the person’s account, if 
(1) the person intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, 
or 
(2) having notice of such belief and that it might induce 
others to change their positions,  the person did not take 
reasonable steps to notify them of the facts. . . . 
b.  Terminology.  The doctrine in this section encompasses definitions of 
“ostensible authority” that hold a principal accountable for an 
appearance of authority arising solely from the principal’s failure to 
use ordinary care.  Some statutes and cases so define “ostensible 
authority,” while others use it as a synonym for “apparent authority” 
as defined in § 2.03.  “Detrimental change of position” means an 
expenditure of money or labor, an incurrence of a loss, or subjection to legal 
liability, not the loss of the benefit of a bargain. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
251 See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text. 
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The third effect of eliminating the perceived agency language from 
section 7.07 is to move the issue of holding individuals liable for the acts 
of another who is not his agent to the forefront of the Restatement.  It 
appears that the drafters of the Restatement Third were making a 
concerted effort to consolidate sections of the Restatement Second.252  In 
fact, section 7.07 incorporates all or part of thirty different sections from 
the Restatement Second.253  Undoubtedly, when trying to combine so 
many sections, priorities have to be set and certain concepts take a back 
seat to others.  In the Restatement Third, perceived agency suffers that fate 
by being buried in Comment f of a section concerned with determining 
whether or not a person is acting within his scope of employment.254  
This is not to say that questions about scope of employment and 
perceived agency are not related.  However, as previously discussed, 
perceived agency has been used in contexts beyond the traditional scope 
of employment inquiries.255  Furthermore, including the doctrine of 
perceived agency within the Restatement Third’s section on scope of 
employment makes little sense considering the questions each 
methodology tries to answer. 
The purpose of section 7.07 is to define when an employer is liable 
for the tortious acts of an employee.256  In order to fulfill this purpose, 
section 7.07 presupposes an employment relationship because, without 
one, there is no scope of employment.  However, this underlying 
assumption is what makes including the perceived agency language in 
section 7.07 problematic.  The doctrine of perceived agency is a question 
of liability where no actual agency exists, but the purpose of section 7.07 
is to answer a question that presumes an agency relationship.  Because 
section 7.07 and the doctrine of perceived agency are attempting to 
answer greatly different questions, they are at odds with one another.  
However, eliminating the doctrine of perceived agency from the 
Restatement Third is not the only change that must be made in order to 
maintain continuity within the law of agency and specifically answer the 
question of when to hold people responsible for the acts of non-agents. 
                                                 
252 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY parallel tbls. 
253 Id. 
254 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07. 
255 See supra Part III.A.2. 
256 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07. 
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C. Proposed Amendment to Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.05 257 
§ 2.05 Estoppel To Deny Existence Of Agency 
Relationship 
A person who has not made a manifestation that an 
actor has authority as an agent and who is not otherwise 
liable as a party to a transaction purportedly done by the 
actor on that person’s account is subject to liability to a 
third party who justifiably is induced to make a 
detrimental change in position because the transaction is 
believed to be on the person’s account, if 
(1) the person, through manifestations to the third party, 
intentionally caused such belief, or 
(2) the person, through lack of due care, carelessly 
caused such belief, or 
(2)(3) having notice of such belief and that it might 
induce others to change their positions, the person did 
not take reasonable steps to notify them of the facts. 
Comment: . . . 
c. In general.  The estoppel stated in this section 
protects third parties who justifiably rely on a belief that 
an actor is an agent and who act on that belief to their 
detriment.  The doctrine is applicable when the person 
against whom estoppel is asserted has made no 
manifestation that an actor has authority as an agent but 
because of manifestations or a lack of due care by the person is 
responsible for the third party’s belief that an actor is an 
agent and the third party has justifiably been induced by 
that belief to undergo a detrimental change in position. 
Most often Many times the person estopped will be 
responsible for the third party’s erroneous belief as the 
consequence of a failure to use reasonable care, either to 
prevent circumstances that foreseeably led to the belief, 
or to correct the belief once on notice of it. . . . 
d. Rationale. . . .Estoppel In cases where the third 
party’s belief is caused by a lack of due care estoppel is 
analyzed with doctrinal elements similar to those 
                                                 
257 The proposals are the contribution of the author.  Specifically, the proposed insertions 
are in italics and the deletions are struck out. 
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applicable to a claim of negligent misrepresentation.  See 
Restatement Second, Torts § 552. . . .  
Illustrations. 
1. Hospital H hires an independent firm F to manage 
the emergency room personnel.  All doctors that work in the 
emergency room are independent contractors and not 
employees of H.  T brings her daughter to the emergency room 
for care.  B, an emergency room doctor, treats the girl 
negligently.  Had T known the doctors in the emergency room 
were not employees of H she would have taken her daughter to 
another hospital.  If it is found that H had notice that 
individuals using the emergency room believed the doctors 
were employees of H and H failed to correct those beliefs, H 
could be liable despite a lack of an agency relationship. 
2.  Same facts as 1, except that T would have used the 
emergency room no matter who the emergency room doctors 
worked for.  H is not liable because T has not detrimentally 
changed position. 
3.  Franchisor M engages in a national advertising 
campaign to promote patronage to its franchisee’s restaurant.  
M does not retain control over its franchisees although it 
offers suggestions and tips on how its franchisees may 
improve its business.  Further, although M does not own the 
franchisee restaurants it does not require franchisee to notify 
customers in any way that the restaurant is not owned by M. 
Customer C, relying on a perceived uniformity of service and 
products at M restaurants, dines at a M restaurant which is 
franchised to K.  C is burned by negligently produced coffee.  
C would not have dined at the restaurant if he had known it 
was not owned by M. M is liable because it held out to the 
public that M restaurants were a commonly owned enterprise 
and carelessly caused the belief that all M restaurants were 
owned by Franchisor M. 
4.  Same facts as 3, except that M requires all 
franchisees to prominently display signs that state the 
restaurant is not owned by Franchisor M.  M is likely not 
liable because they have placed C on notice that they are not 
the principal of K. 
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5.  Same facts as 3, except that C would have eaten at 
the M restaurant even if he had known that it was actually 
owned by K.  M is not liable since C did not detrimentally rely 
on M’s holding out. 
D. Commentary 
These revisions expand the scope and discussion of estoppel within 
the Restatement Third.  In designing section 2.05, the drafters were guided 
by two principals.  First, anytime estoppel and another section of the 
Restatement are applicable, estoppel is submissive and the other section 
is controlling.258  Second, given estoppel’s submissive role in the 
Restatement Third, section 2.05 was drafted narrowly to avoid as much 
overlap with other sections as possible.  As a result, section 2.05 and its 
illustrations are focused on situations where the principal has 
negligently caused the belief or negligently failed to correct a belief.259  
However, if perceived agency was eliminated from the Restatement Third 
it would be necessary to expand the language of section 2.05 to include 
situations traditionally thought to fall under the doctrine of perceived 
agency.   
The above revisions to section 2.05 expand the doctrine of agency by 
estoppel.  The two illustrations are based on actual cases.260  The first 
illustration is based on Gasbarra v. St. James Hospital261 and the second is 
based on Miller v. McDonald’s Corp.262  Gasbarra and McDonald’s Corp. 
represent the two contexts in which perceived agency and/or agency by 
estoppel are most often used:  employer-employee and franchisor-
franchisee.  These revisions will help courts accurately apply agency by 
estoppel in the future and allow the doctrine to fill the void in agency 
law created by removing perceived agency from the Restatement Third.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although the doctrines of perceived agency and agency by estoppel 
operate in substantially the same manner, they differ in the level of 
reliance required to apply them.  The law of agency could operate with 
only one of the doctrines, as they both apply to situations where a 
principal is somehow responsible for the beliefs of an innocent third 
                                                 
258 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (stating that estoppel is a subservient 
doctrine to the other sections of the Restatement Third). 
259 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05. 
260 See infra notes 262-63. 
261 See generally Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 406 N.E.2d 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
262 See generally Miller v. McDonald’s Corp., 945 P.2d 1107 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). 
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party.  As such, the doctrine of perceived agency should be eliminated 
from the Restatement Third and an expansive view of agency by estoppel 
should be adopted.  Estoppel’s clear requirement of detrimental reliance 
will aid courts that try to apply the doctrine and prevent plaintiffs from 
recovering for actions they would have taken regardless of the 
principal’s manifestations or negligence.  Furthermore, because estoppel 
is an equitable doctrine, courts may consider fairness to all parties in 
deciding whether to impose liability rather than following a formalistic 
rule that mandates liability if certain conditions are met.  This freedom 
would allow courts to punish the most egregious defendants for their 
misrepresentations while giving businesses permission to experiment 
with different and new forms of business organizations which may have 
unforeseen consequences on their agency relationships. 
Chad P. Wade263 
                                                 
263  J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University School of Law (2008); B.A., 
Economics,University of Wisconsin—Eau Claire (2005).  There are simply too many people 
I should thank to list them all, but I must mention a few.  First, to Angela, thank you for 
inspiring me each day to be better at everything.  Second, to my family, thank you all for 
encouraging me through this process and always supporting me in whatever path my life 
has taken.  Last, I must thank Professor Telman for his guidance and suggestions through 
this process; Professor Morrisson for being a mentor and friend; Professor Kemp for 
teaching me to question; and Professor McAleer for teaching me to wonder.  After 
completing this process I realize that “[i]f I have seen further it is because I stand upon the 
shoulders of giants.”  Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (February 5, 1675), 
http://www.bartleby.com/66/18/41418.html. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/10
